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But that due must
be paid, not out of deficit, but out of surplus. As long as Ireland has
a deficit produced by poverty, it is absurd to talk to her about
Empire. Once she has a surplus--and a surplus will soon come with the
working of Home Rule--then she will play her part in a manly way.

For we must never forget that Home Rule in itself is a great financial
asset. During the brief period of the Grattan Parliament, as we have
seen, Ireland doubled her exports. During that time the Parliament
carried out public works in every part of Ireland, and industry throve.
Those things cannot be done by an absentee Parliament. They can only be
done by a Parliament on the spot. They are intensely and earnestly
needed by Ireland at present. For Ireland is largely an industrial
derelict, waiting for the restoring hand of a central governing power.
It is impossible to put this aspect of the matter into figures. Here we
must move in faith. But we cannot see this matter clearly unless we
believe firmly--as we have every justification for believing--that Home
Rule means wealth to Ireland.


THE FINANCIAL COMMISSION

But we have to remember that since 1893 a great and authoritative
Financial Commission has reported that England stands in debt to
Ireland.

The British public has never quite realised what the Report of 1896
signified, or quite understood the effect which it produced on the
Irish nation. The Financial Relations Commission was a body created by
the Liberal Government in 1894, soon after the defeat of the Home Rule
Bill, and partly as a consequence of that defeat. It consisted of
fifteen of the ablest financiers in the United Kingdom, including two
great Treasury Chiefs, Lord Farrer and Lord Welby, Sir Robert Hamilton,
Sir David Barbour, and that great Parliamentary financial expert Mr.
W.A. Hunter. The chair was occupied by an ex-Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Mr. Childers.[75] The Commission sat for two years, and
carried out a most searching investigation. They reported in 1896.
Their united Report consists of only two pages in the Blue Book,[76]
and the essence of it is contained in five short paragraphs, as
follows:--

(1) That Great Britain and Ireland must, for the purpose of
this inquiry, be considered as separate entities.

(2) That the Act of Union imposed upon Ireland a burden which,
as events showed, she was unable to bear.

(3) That the increase of taxation laid upon Ireland between
1853 and 1860 was not justified by the then existing
circumstances.

(4) That identity of rates of taxation does not necessarily
involve equality of burden.

(5) That whilst the actual tax revenue of Ireland is about
one-eleventh of that of Great Britain, the relative taxable
capacity of Ireland is very much smaller, and is not estimated
by any of us as exceeding one-twentieth.

Now, what does this amount to? As worked out in the various minority
reports, it means that, in the opinion of this Commission, Ireland has
been over-taxed for many years at the rate of over £2,000,000 a year.
As to the precise sum the Commissioners differ. Some went as high as
£3,500,000, others down to £2,000,000, but all, except Sir Thomas
Sutherland and Sir David Barbour, set it at about £2,000,000. Mr.
Childers, unhappily, died before the close of the Commission. But he
wrote an epoch-making Report, in which he estimated the excess of
taxation at £2,250,000.[77]

Now, it is useless to make light of this Report. It was the solemn
judgment of the highest financiers of the day on the financial workings
of the Act of Union. If we turn back to the debates in Parliament in
1800, especially to the speeches of Pitt, prophesying that the Act of
Union would take the wealth of England across St. George's Channel, and
apply it to Ireland, we cannot escape some sombre reflections on the
short-sightedness of great statesmen. Pitt's judgment was disturbed by
the existence of a war with France, which created in him an intense
desire to unite the two countries. Otherwise he would probably have
foreseen that for a rich partner to unite his finances with a poor
partner certainly meant bankruptcy for the one, and probably, in the
end, also ruin for the other. Taking the nineteenth century as a whole,
the fundamental financial error has been this--that Ireland has been
taxed on the theory of equality with England in point of wealth. That
equality has not existed. What was a light burden for the one country
has proved for the other a burden too heavy to be borne.

The result has been that Ireland, being continually overtaxed, has sunk
steadily in her resources, and has gradually become less and less of a
taxable country. The taxes have returned less and less, and have had to
be returned in the form of relief of poverty. A crisis in that
situation is now reached, and it is quite clear that we stand at the
parting of two roads. Now that the balance is beginning to work against
England, it is certain that the only alternative to the restoration of
Ireland is the gradual dragging down of England.

It is useless and unjust to argue, in answer to this great Report, that
Ireland ought not to have been regarded as a financial unit at all. Any
country that is an island, and possesses a social organisation of its
own, with a definite relationship between rich and poor, must
necessarily be a financial unit. But even if that were not so, it is
too late to argue the question with any honour. For we must never
forget that the whole financial legislation of the United Kingdom in
regard to Ireland is based upon the Act of Union, which was practically
a solemn treaty between the two countries, passed--we will not say
how--by both the British and the Irish Parliaments. It is the essence
of that treaty that Ireland entered into it upon certain financial
terms, and among those terms was the condition that she should be
treated as a separate financial unit.

This Report, therefore, immensely strengthens the claim of Ireland to
more generous financial terms in 1912 than in 1886 or in 1893.

We want to set up in Ireland a high and strong sense of financial
responsibility. The control therefore, as well as the expenditure, must
be placed as far as possible in Irish hands, and for that purpose the
management, as well as the collection, of Irish taxes ought to be left
as far as possible with the Irish Exchequer that must be set up.

The tendency is started by the principle of the Bill of 1912, and the
policy of the next decade will be to place in Irish hands as rapidly
as possible both the collection and the administration of the finance
for all the great Irish services, including those at present "reserved"
as well as those at present "transferred."

This brings us finally to the vexed problem of Customs and Excise. It
is notorious that the greater part of the Irish revenue--the revenue of
a poor country, derived for the most part through indirect taxation--is
drawn from Customs and Excise.[78]

It is not, perhaps, surprising, therefore, that the Bill of 1912 should
go some way towards meeting the demand that has sprung up in various
quarters, both in Ireland and in England, for the control of customs
and excise by the Irish Parliament. The proposal of the Government is
that we should extend to Ireland, with some variations, what is at
present the financial arrangement in regard to customs and excise
between the British Treasury and the Isle of Man. The first fact to be
remembered quite clearly is that the Irish Parliament is absolutely
debarred from creating any new duty. It will not be able to draw up any
new set of tariffs. In other words, it will have to adapt its revenue
to the general financial policy of the central government, whether that
be a free trade policy or a tariff reform policy. But Ireland is to be
allowed to vary her customs within certain limits. She may, for
instance, reduce her customs to the lowest point, on the only condition
that she loses thereby equivalent revenue. But on the main custom
duties which fall on such articles as tea, sugar, cocoa, tobacco, and
so forth, she cannot raise her customs beyond 10 per cent. The only
exceptions will be beer and spirits, on which Ireland may raise her
customs or her excise to any point that she desires. It will be
necessary, of course, to have rebates or countervailing duties in
regard to articles transferred from Great Britain to Ireland, or _vice
versa_, and to that very slight extent alone will these proposals
affect the trade relations between Ireland and England.

I may add that the same power of reduction or addition will extend both
to income tax and death duties up to the limit of 10 per cent. for
increase--a provision which will safeguard the industries of the North
from being sacrificed to the needs of the South.[79]

Such are the proposals of the 1912 Home Rule Bill. They appear to
present an ingenious compromise between the complete delegation of
customs and excise and the complete centralisation. There are very
serious objections to the complete separation of these duties. One is
that separation of customs has been accepted everywhere as vitally
inconsistent with the Federal idea. No State of the American Union has
separate customs. Even Bavaria, a State of the German Empire which
possesses, as we have seen, a separate army, post office, and national
railways, has no separate customs. Such a plan could, therefore, hardly
fit in with Federalism, as at present realised in any part of the
world. The second objection would be the very grave offence given to
the free trade sentiment of Great Britain, and the very grave injury to
trade between Britain and Ireland, if we were to hand over to Ireland
the right of placing taxes on English goods. Under such circumstances
it would certainly be impossible to persuade the British public to
grant a bonus to Ireland in order to give her the power of taxing
British goods. That would clearly be too great a strain upon the
Christian sentiment even of John Bull.

Parnell, it is well known, felt a strong temptation to make a demand
for separate customs. But he always put it aside as impolitic, probably
on this very ground; and the rise of the Tariff Reform movement since
his death has certainly not weakened those considerations, because it
has led to a corresponding rise of free trade feeling among a large
part of the British public on this side of the Channel.

It is quite clear that the Government's compromise on customs and
excise, ingenious as it is, will be subject to very close and shrewd
criticism. But the first duty of Home Rulers, both in Great Britain and
Ireland, is to avoid the carefully-baited trap of a quarrel on points
of detail. That is the obvious game of the enemies of Home Rule. The
proper policy of every true Home Ruler is to preserve through all the
vicissitudes of those financial discussions a sane and steady
perspective, well knowing that, after all, finance is not really the
true heart of this problem.


THE MIGHTY HOPE

We must not reduce a great human problem to a squabble over
pocket-money. We must in this, too, as in the religious and political
sides of the question, have faith in the result of freedom. We must
believe, as we have every right to believe, that liberty will bring to
Ireland a new power over her resources, and a new skill in using
them--that her magnificent harbours will no longer be silent, or her
rivers empty; that her factories will hum once more with a new life and
industry; that the grass will cease to grow in her streets and on her
wharves, and that the rich and strong will cease to fly from her
shores. All this must be taken into account in any reasonable
calculation of the future. It is just as foolish to err from lack of
faith as it is to blunder from excess of credulity.

For here, indeed, we have an excellent precedent to give us hope. It
was the common evidence of all experts at the time that Ireland grew
greatly richer under the twenty years of Grattan's Parliament. The
future Irish Parliament will, just as it will be more representative,
so supply Ireland with a machine even more efficient than Grattan's
Parliament. If so, we have every reason to suppose that within twenty
years we shall have a richer Ireland, with a far greater taxable
capacity. For can we doubt that the alchemy of liberty will here, too,
even in this sordid realm of finance, repeat its ancient power?

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[72] For these proposals see Appendix D.

[73] For instance, in the absence of Irish Customs the estimates of
true Irish revenue can only be approximate. On the expenditure side,
too, there are grave matters of consideration. For instance, should the
vote for Irish Constabulary be regarded as a local or Imperial charge?
Or Irish judges, or even Irish poverty? It was the definite opinion of
the Financial Relations Commission that until Home Rule was set up
there could be no possible way of distinguishing between local and
Imperial expenditure in Ireland.

[74] There are 4,397 civil servants in Ireland with incomes over £160 a
year, as against 944 for Scotland. (Inland Revenue Report, 1909-1910.)

[75] The members of this Commission were:--The Rt. Hon. Hugh Childers,
Lord Farrer, Lord Welby, the Rt. Hon. O'Conor Don, Sir Robt. Hamilton,
Sir Thomas Sutherland, K.C.M.G., Sir David Barbour, K.C.S.I., the Hon.
Ed. Blake, M.P., Bertram W. Currie, Esq., W.A. Hunter, Esq., M.P., C.E.
Martin, Esq., J.E. Redmond, Esq., M.P., Thomas Sexton, Esq., M.P., and
added in June, 1894, Henry F. Slattery, Esq., and G.W. Wolff, Esq.,
M.P.

[76] C. 8262, price 1s. 10d.

[77] Lord MacDonnell has estimated the total over-payment of Ireland in
the nineteenth century as exceeding £300,000,000.

[78] Out of a total tax-revenue of £24,000,000 from 1906-9 Ireland paid
no less than £18,000,000 in Customs and Excise. (Inland Revenue
Report.)

[79] See the Government Outline of Financial Provisions, Appendix A.




HOME RULE

APPENDICES


A. THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912.

B. THE SHRINKAGE OF IRELAND.

C. THE ACT OF UNION.

D. THE HOME RULE BILLS OF 1886 AND 1893.

E. THE IRISH BOARD OF AGRICULTURE.

F. THE REDUCTION IN IRISH PAUPERISM.

G. THE LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881.

H. THE CONGESTED DISTRICTS BOARD.

J. IRISH CANALS AND RAILWAYS.

K. HOME RULE PARLIAMENTS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.




APPENDIX A

THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912.


A BILL TO

[Sidenote: A.D. 1912.]

AMEND the PROVISION for the Government of Ireland. BE it enacted by the
King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:--


_Legislative Authority._

[Sidenote: Establishment of Irish Parliament.]

1.--(1) On and after the appointed day there shall be in Ireland an
Irish Parliament consisting of His Majesty the King and two Houses,
namely, the Irish Senate and the Irish House of Commons.

(2) Notwithstanding the establishment of the Irish Parliament or
anything contained in this Act, the supreme power and authority of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and
undiminished over all persons, matters, and things within His Majesty's
dominions.

[Sidenote: Legislative powers of Irish Parliament.]

2. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Irish Parliament shall
have power to make laws for the peace, order, and government of Ireland
with the following limitations, namely, that they shall not have power
to make laws except in respect of matters exclusively relating to
Ireland or some part thereof, and (without prejudice to that general
limitation) that they shall not have power to make laws in respect of
the following matters in particular, or any of them, namely--

(1) The Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a Regency; or
the Lord Lieutenant except as respects the exercise of his
executive power in relation to Irish services as defined
for the purposes of this Act; or

(2) The making of peace or war or matters arising from a state
of war; or the regulation of the conduct of any portion of
His Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities
between Foreign States with which His Majesty is at peace,
in relation to those hostilities; or

(3) The navy, the army, the territorial force, or any other
naval or military force, or the defence of the realm, or any
other naval or military matter; or

(4) Treaties, or any relations, with Foreign States, or
relations with other parts of His Majesty's dominions, or
offences connected with any such treaties or relations, or
procedure connected with the extradition of criminals under
any treaty, or the return of fugitive offenders from or to
any part of His Majesty's dominions; or

(5) Dignities or titles of honour; or

(6) Treason, treason felony, alienage, naturalisation, or aliens
as such; or

(7) Trade with any place out of Ireland (except so far as trade
may be affected by the exercise of the powers of taxation
given to the Irish Parliament, or by the regulation of
importation for the sole purpose of preventing contagious
disease); quarantine; or navigation, including merchant
shipping (except as respects inland waters and local health
or harbour regulations); or

(8) Lighthouses, buoys, or beacons (except so far as they can
consistently with any general Act of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom) be constructed or maintained by a local
harbour authority; or

(9) Coinage; legal tender; or any change in the standard of
weights and measures; or

(10) Trade marks, designs, merchandise marks, copyright, or
patent rights; or

(11) Any of the following matters (in this Act referred to as
reserved matters), namely--

[Sidenote: 8 Edw. 7. c. 40 1 & 2 Geo. 5. c. 16. 1 & 2 Geo. 5. c.
55. 9 Edw. c. 7.]

(a) The general subject-matter of the Acts relating
to Land Purchase in Ireland, the Old Age Pensions Acts,
1908 and 1911, the National Insurance Act, 1911, and
the Labour Exchanges Act, 1909;

(b) The collection of taxes;

(c) The Royal Irish Constabulary and the management
and control of that force;

(d) Post Office Savings Banks, Trustee Savings Banks,
and Friendly Societies; and

(e) Public loans made in Ireland _before the passing
of this Act_:

Provided that the limitation on the powers of the
Irish Parliament under this section shall cease as
respects any such reserved matter if the corresponding
reserved service is transferred to the Irish Government
under the provisions of this Act.

Any law made in contravention of the limitations imposed by this
section shall, so far as it contravenes those limitations, be void.

[Sidenote: Prohibition of laws interfering with religious equality,
&c.]

3. In the exercise of their power to make laws under this Act the Irish
Parliament shall not make a law so as either directly or indirectly to
establish or endow any religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof,
or give a preference, privilege, or advantage, or impose any disability
or disadvantage, on account of religious belief or religious or
ecclesiastical status, or make any religious belief or religious
ceremony a condition of the validity of any marriage.

Any law made in contravention of the restrictions imposed by this
section shall, so far as it contravenes those restrictions, be void.


_Executive Authority._

[Sidenote: Executive power in Ireland.]

4.--(1) The executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in His
Majesty the King, and nothing in this Act shall affect the exercise of
that power except as respects Irish services as defined for the
purposes of this Act.

(2) As respects those Irish services the Lord Lieutenant or other chief
executive officer or officers for the time being appointed in his
place, on behalf of His Majesty, shall exercise any prerogative or
other executive power of His Majesty the exercise of which may be
delegated to him by His Majesty.

(3) The power so delegated shall be exercised through such Irish
Departments as may be established by Irish Act, or subject thereto, by
the Lord Lieutenant, and the Lord Lieutenant may appoint officers to
administer those Departments, and those officers shall hold office
during the pleasure of the Lord Lieutenant.

(4) The persons who are for the time being heads of such Irish
Departments as may be determined by Irish Act, or, in the absence of
any such determination, by the Lord Lieutenant, and such other persons
(if any) as the Lord Lieutenant may appoint, shall be the Irish
Ministers.

Provided that--

(a) No such person shall be an Irish Minister unless he is a
member of the Privy Council of Ireland; and

(b) No such person shall hold office as an Irish Minister for a
longer period than six months, unless he is or becomes a
member of one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament; and

(c) Any such person not being the head of an Irish Department
shall hold office as an Irish Minister during the pleasure
of the Lord Lieutenant in the same manner as the head of an
Irish Department holds his office.

(5) The persons who are Irish Ministers for the time being shall be an
Executive Committee of the Privy Council of Ireland (in this Act
referred to as the "Executive Committee"), to aid and advise the Lord
Lieutenant in the exercise of his executive power in relation to Irish
services.

(6) For the purposes of this Act, "Irish services" are all public
services in connexion with the administration of the civil government
of Ireland except the administration of matters with respect to which
the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws, including in the
exception all public services in connexion with the administration of
the reserved matters (in this Act referred to as "reserved services").

[Sidenote: Future transfer of certain reserved services.]

5.--(1) The public services in connexion with the administration of the
Acts relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary and the management and
control of that force, shall by virtue of this Act be transferred from
the Government of the United Kingdom to the Irish Government on the
expiration of a period of six years from the appointed day and those
public services shall then cease to be reserved services and become
Irish services.

(2) If a resolution is passed by both Houses of the Irish Parliament
providing for the transfer from the Government of the United Kingdom to
the Irish Government of the following reserved services, namely--

(a) All public services in connexion with the administration of
the Old Age Pensions Acts, 1908 and 1911; or

(b) All public services in connexion with the administration of
Part I. of the National Insurance Act, 1911; or

(c) All public services in connexion with the administration of
Part II. of the National Insurance Act, 1911, and the Labour
Exchanges Act, 1909; or

(d) All public services in connexion with the administration of
Post Office Savings Banks, Trustee Savings Banks, and
Friendly Societies;

the public services to which the resolution relates shall be
transferred accordingly as from a date fixed by the resolution, being a
date not less than a year after the date on which the resolution is
passed, and shall on the transfer taking effect cease to be reserved
services and become Irish services:

Provided that this provision shall not take effect as respects the
transfer of the services in connexion with Post Office Savings Banks,
Trustee Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies until the expiration of
ten years from the appointed day.

(3) On any transfer under or by virtue of this section, the transitory
provisions of this Act (so far as applicable) and the provisions of
this Act as to existing Irish officers shall apply with respect to the
transfer, with the substitution of the date of the transfer for the
appointed day, and of a period of five years from that date for the
transitional period.


_Irish Parliament._

[Sidenote: Summoning, &c., of Irish Parliament.]

6.--(1) There shall be a session of the Irish Parliament once at least
in every year, so that twelve months shall not intervene between the
last sitting of the Parliament in one session and their first sitting
in the next session.

(2) The Lord Lieutenant shall, in His Majesty's name, summon, prorogue,
and dissolve the Irish Parliament.

[Sidenote: Royal assent to Bills of Irish Parliament]

7. The Lord Lieutenant shall give or withhold the assent of His Majesty
to Bills passed by the two Houses of the Irish Parliament, subject to
the following limitations; namely--

(1) He shall comply with any instructions given by His Majesty
in respect of any such Bill; and

(2) He shall, if so directed by His Majesty, postpone giving the
assent of His Majesty to any such Bill presented to him for
assent for such period as His Majesty may direct.

[Sidenote: Composition of Irish Senate.]

8.--(1) The Irish Senate shall consist of forty senators nominated as
respects the first senators by the Lord Lieutenant subject to any
instructions given by His Majesty in respect of the nomination, and
afterwards by the Lord Lieutenant on the advice of the Executive
Committee.

(2) The term of office of every senator shall be eight years, and shall
not be affected by a dissolution; one fourth of the senators shall
retire in every second year, and their seats shall be filled by a new
nomination.

(3) If the place of a senator becomes vacant before the expiration of
his term of office, the Lord Lieutenant shall, unless the place becomes
vacant not more than six months before the expiration of that term of
office, nominate a senator in the stead of the senator whose place is
vacant, but any senator so nominated to fill a vacancy shall hold
office only so long as the senator in whose stead he is nominated would
have held office.

[Sidenote: Composition of Irish House of Commons.]

9.--(1) The Irish House of Commons shall consist of one hundred and
sixty-four members, returned by the constituencies in Ireland named in
the First Part of the First Schedule to this Act in accordance with
that Schedule, and elected by the same electors and in the same manner
as members returned by constituencies in Ireland to serve in the
Parliament of the United Kingdom.

(2) The Irish House of Commons when summoned shall, unless sooner
dissolved, have continuance for five years from the day on which the
summons directs the House to meet and no longer.

(3) After _three years from the passing of this Act_, the Irish
Parliament may alter, as respects the Irish House of Commons, the
qualification of the electors, the mode of election, the
constituencies, and the distribution of the members of the House among
the constituencies, provided that in any new distribution the number of
the members of the House shall not be altered, and due regard shall be
had to the population of the constituencies other than University
constituencies.

[Sidenote: Money Bills.]

10.--(1) Bills appropriating revenue or money, or imposing taxation,
shall originate only in the Irish House of Commons, but a Bill shall
not be taken to appropriate revenue or money, or to impose taxation by
reason only of its containing provisions for the imposition or
appropriation of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the payment
or appropriation of fees for licences or fees for services under the
Bill.

(2) The Irish House of Commons shall not adopt or pass any resolution,
address, or Bill for the appropriation for any purpose of any part of
the public revenue of Ireland or of any tax, except in pursuance of a
recommendation from the Lord Lieutenant in the session in which the
vote, resolution, address, or Bill is proposed.

(3) The Irish Senate may not reject any Bill which deals only with the
imposition of taxation or appropriation of revenue or money for the
services of the Irish Government, and may not amend any Bill so far as
the Bill imposes taxation or appropriates revenue or money for the
services of the Irish Government, and the Irish Senate may not amend
any Bill so as to increase any proposed charges or burden on the
people.

(4) Any Bill which appropriates revenue or money for the ordinary
annual services of the Irish Government shall deal only with that
appropriation.

[Sidenote: Disagreement between two Houses of Irish Parliament.]

11.--(1) If the Irish House of Commons pass any Bill and the Irish
Senate reject or fail to pass it, or pass it with amendments to which
the Irish House of Commons will not agree, and if the Irish House of
Commons in the next session again pass the Bill with or without any
amendments which have been made or agreed to by the Irish Senate, and
the Irish Senate reject or fail to pass it, or pass it with amendments
to which the Irish House of Commons will not agree, the Lord Lieutenant
may during that session convene a joint sitting of the members of the
two Houses.

(2) The members present at any such joint sitting may deliberate and
shall vote together upon the Bill as last proposed by the Irish House
of Commons, and upon the amendments (if any) which have been made
therein by the one House and not agreed to by the other; and any such
amendments which are affirmed by a majority of the total number of
members of the two Houses present at the sitting shall be taken to have
been carried.

(3) If the Bill with the amendments (if any) so taken to have been
carried is affirmed by a majority of the total number of members of the
two Houses present at any such sitting, it shall be taken to have been
duly passed by both Houses.

[Sidenote: Privileges, qualifications, &c. of members of Irish
Parliament.]

12.--(1) The powers, privileges, and immunities of the Irish Senate and
of the Irish House of Commons, and of the members and of the committees
of the Irish Senate and the Irish House of Commons, shall be such as
may be defined by Irish Act, but so that they shall never exceed those
for the time being held and enjoyed by the Commons House of Parliament
of the United Kingdom and its members and committees, and, until so
defined, shall be those held and enjoyed by the Commons House of
Parliament of the United Kingdom, and its members and committees at the
date of _the passing of this Act_.

(2) The law, as for the time being in force, relating to the
qualification and disqualification of members of the Commons House of
Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the taking of any oath required
to be taken by a member of that House, shall apply to members of the
Irish House of Commons.

(3) Any peer, whether of the United Kingdom, Great Britain, England,
Scotland, or Ireland, shall be qualified to be a member of either
House.

(4) A member of either House shall be incapable of being nominated or
elected, or of sitting, as a member of the other House, but an Irish
Minister who is a member of either House shall have the right to sit
and speak in both Houses, but shall vote only in the House of which he
is a member.

(5) A member of either House may resign his seat by giving notice of
resignation to the person and in the manner directed by standing orders
of the House, or if there is no such direction, by notice in writing of
resignation sent to the Lord Lieutenant, and his seat shall become
vacant on notice of resignation being given.

(6) The powers of either House shall not be affected by any vacancy
therein, or by any defect in the nomination, election, or
qualification, of any member thereof.

(7) His Majesty may by Order in Council declare that the holders of the
offices in the Irish Executive named in the Order shall not be
disqualified for being members of either House of the Irish Parliament
by reason of holding office under the Crown, and except as otherwise
provided by Irish Act, the Order shall have effect as if it were
enacted in this Act, but on acceptance of any such office the seat of
any such person in the Irish House of Commons shall be vacated unless
he has accepted the office in succession to some other of the said
offices.


_Irish Representation in the House of Commons._

[Sidenote: Representation of Ireland in the House of Commons of the
United Kingdom.]

13. Unless and until the Parliament of the United Kingdom otherwise
determine, the following provisions shall have effect:--

(1) After the appointed day the number of members returned by
constituencies in Ireland to serve in the Parliament of the
United Kingdom shall be forty-two and the constituencies
returning those members shall (in lieu of the existing
constituencies) be the constituencies named in the second
Part of the First Schedule to this Act, and no University
in Ireland shall return a member to the Parliament of the
United Kingdom.

(2) The election laws and the laws relating to the qualification
of parliamentary electors shall not, so far as they relate
to elections of members returned by constituencies in
Ireland to serve in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, be
altered by the Irish Parliament, but this enactment shall
not prevent the Irish Parliament from dealing with any
officers concerned with the issue of writs of election, and
if any officers are so dealt with, it shall be lawful for
His Majesty by Order in Council to arrange for the issue of
any such writs, and the writs issued in pursuance of the
Order shall be of the same effect as if issued in manner
heretofore accustomed.

* * * * *

So far for the constitutional clauses. The clauses from 14 to 26 are
occupied with finance. They are so technical that it will be more
convenient to substitute the terms of the very clear Memorandum issued
by the Government:--


OUTLINE OF FINANCIAL PROVISIONS.

_Present Irish Revenue and Expenditure._

It is estimated that the revenue to be derived from Ireland in the year
1912-13 will be as follows:--

£
Customs 3,230,000
Excise 3,320,000
Income tax 1,512,000
Estate duties 939,000
Stamps 347,000
Miscellaneous 137,000
Post Office 1,354,000
-----------
Total 10,839,000
-----------

It is estimated that the expenditure for Irish purposes in the year
1912-13 will amount to £12,354,000. The expenditure may be divided for
the purposes of this Memorandum as follows:--

£
All purposes not separately specified 5,462,000
Post Office 1,600,000
Old Age Pensions 2,664,000
Charges under the Land Purchase Acts 761,000
National Insurance and Labour Exchanges 191,500
Royal Irish Constabulary 1,377,500
Collection of revenue 298,000
----------
Total 12,354,000
----------

The expenditure therefore exceeds the revenue by £1,515,000.

It is anticipated that in a period of ten or fifteen years the charges
under the existing Land Purchase Acts will increase by £450,000, and
under the National Insurance Act by £300,000. On the other hand, it is
estimated that within twenty years the cost of Old Age Pensions will
decrease by £200,000.


_Charges upon the Irish Exchequer._

The Bill provides for the establishment of an Irish Exchequer and an
Irish Consolidated Fund.

From the Irish Exchequer will be defrayed the whole of the present and
future cost of Irish government, with the exception of the expenditure
on certain services, termed in the Bill Reserved Services.


_Charges upon the Imperial Exchequer._

The Imperial Government will retain the control, and the Imperial
Exchequer will continue to bear the cost, of the Reserved Services,
namely, Old Age Pensions, National Insurance, Labour Exchanges, Land
Purchase, and Collection of Taxes. For a period of six years the Royal
Irish Constabulary will also be one of the Reserved Services.

There are provisions for the transfer to the Irish Government of
certain of the Reserved Services under the conditions stated below.


_Revenue of the Irish Exchequer._

The Bill provides, in the first instance, for the period during which
the yield of Irish taxes is less than the cost of Irish administration,
and contemplates certain modifications after a financial equilibrium
has been attained.

During that period the revenue of the Irish Exchequer will consist of a
sum transferred annually from the Imperial Exchequer, and termed in the
Bill the Transferred Sum, together with the receipts of the Irish Post
Office.

The Transferred Sum will be fixed at the outset at such amount as will
cover, with the addition of the Post Office revenue, the present
expenditure on Irish Government, with the exception of the cost of the
Reserved Services. Included in the Transferred Sum will also be a
specified sum as surplus. The amount of this surplus will be £500,000
annually for a period of three years, then diminishing by £50,000 a
year for six years till it reaches £200,000, at which sum it will
remain.

Subject to this variation in the amount of the surplus and to certain
minor variations specified in the Bill, and subject also to any changes
consequent upon the exercise by the Irish Parliament of the powers of
increasing or reducing taxation which are defined below, the amount of
the Transferred Sum, fixed in the first year after the passing of the
Act, will remain the same until an equilibrium is reached between the
total revenue derived from Ireland and the total expenditure on Irish
purposes.


_Revenue of the Imperial Exchequer from Ireland._

The Bill provides that until such equilibrium is established the whole
of the proceeds of all Irish taxes shall be collected by the Treasury
of the United Kingdom, and be paid into the Imperial Exchequer. (This
provision does not apply to Post Office revenue.)

The revenue so collected should be sufficient to cover the Transferred
Sum and to provide a balance sufficient to defray a part of the cost of
the Reserved Services. As the revenue from Ireland increases in the
future, the receipts of the Imperial Exchequer will increase
proportionately, and the yearly deficit which will fall at the outset
upon the Imperial Exchequer will gradually be lessened and ultimately
disappear.


_Joint Exchequer Board._

The Bill establishes a Joint Exchequer Board of Great Britain and
Ireland, consisting of two members appointed by the Imperial Treasury
and two by the Irish Treasury, with a Chairman appointed by His Majesty
the King.

The duty of the Board will be to determine certain questions of fact
arising from time to time under the financial provisions of the Bill.

The figures given in this Paper are estimates only, and do not purport
to be final. The Bill, therefore, does not rest upon these figures, but
enables fuller returns to be obtained after the passing of the Act, and
it provides that the amounts of Irish Revenue and Expenditure for the
purposes of the Act shall be, not the figures given in this Paper, but
such sums as may be determined after the passing of the Act, upon the
basis of these fuller returns and of the more accurate figures of
Revenue and Expenditure which will then be available, by the Joint
Exchequer Board.


_Revenue and Expenditure Accounts._

If, however, the estimates given above are assumed, for purposes of
illustration, to be the figures finally determined, the Irish
Government's Budget in the first year would balance as follows:--

------------------------------+------------------------------
_Revenue._ | _Expenditure._
£ | £
Transferred Sum 6,127,000 | All purposes not
Post Office 1,354,000 | separately
| specified - 5,462,000
Fee Stamps 81,000 | Post Office - 1,600,000
| ----------
| 7,062,000
| Surplus - 500,000*
---------- | ----------
Total - 7,562,000 | Total - 7,562,000
------------------------------+-------------------------------
* Subject to subsequent reduction as stated above.

The Imperial Government's receipts and expenditure on Irish account
would balance as follows:--

------------------------------+--------------------------------
_Revenue._ | _Expenditure._
£ | £
Irish Revenue | Transferred Sum 6,127,000
(excluding Post | Old Age Pensions 2,664,000
Office and fee | National Insurance
stamps) 9,404,000 | and Labour
Deficit 2,015,000 | Exchanges 191,500
| Land Purchase--
| (1.) Land
| Commission 592,000
| (2.) Other
| Charges 169,000
| Constabulary 1,377,500
| Collection of
| Revenue 298,000
---------- | ----------
11,419,000 | Total 11,419,000
------------------------------+--------------------------------


_Powers of Varying Taxation._

The Bill confers on the Irish Parliament the following financial
powers:--

1.